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FROM : Department of State DATE:

SUBJECT : Policy Planning Paper

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SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION

Attached are three copies of the Policy Planning Paper for Morocco, as approved by the members of the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa.

The paper constitutes an official statement of US policy towards Morocco and should be used as a guideline by all elements of the Embassy in the preparation of policy statements, action plans and future budgetary projections.

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MOROCCO: Policy Planning Paper

Approved by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa

June 1971

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## MOROCCO: Policy Planning Paper

### Introduction

Although Morocco has distinctively North African characteristics and is a part of the "Arab" (or at any rate, Islamic) world, geography and the economics of location have given it a very strong North and West orientation. It is a key strategic land mass at the Atlantic end of the Mediterranean, with old cultural and commercial ties with Spain and France.

Historically, the prime American interest in Morocco has been to keep it and its adjacent waters free from influences that might be detrimental to the free flow of commerce and navigation. This is still a major concern. Since World War II, however, we have had a more specific strategic interest in the country, reflected in the 1950's by SAC bases and now by the Kenitra Naval Communications Station. Over the years we have developed something resembling a "special relationship" with the Moroccan Government. This relationship has not only been significant in the bilateral sense, it has helped provide on occasion a bridge of understanding and comprehension to other Arab states.

Our commercial relations with Morocco are still relatively modest. As the country develops, however, we would hope that the technical and financial aid we have provided over the years, would give American business a valuable entree.

### A. U.S. Interests in Morocco

1. The United States has a significant communications facility in the Kenitra complex that is the master communications station for the Mediterranean area and an important link in our world-wide communications network.
2. In Tangier, the U.S. has an important VOA relay station.
3. Because of its development efforts, Morocco is potentially a modest market for U.S. capital goods, services, and possibly for private investment.
4. The US strategic interest in Morocco derives from its geographic location and NATO's responsibility for defense of Western Europe. While denial of military operating rights in Morocco will not significantly restrict NATO's ability to

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carry out its mission in the Mediterranean, NATO (particularly U.S.) ability to pass freely through the Straits of Gibraltar is essential to the protection of the southern flank of Europe.

5. Morocco, in contrast to a substantial part of the Arab world, maintains a cordial relationship with the United States, thus providing the US a valuable means of contact with a significant region.

B. U.S. Objectives Over the Next Five Years

1. Continuation of cordial relations with Morocco.
2. Preservation of U.S. facilities at Kenitra and Tangier as long as they are required.
3. Continuation of Morocco's generally moderate stance on the Middle East problem and receptiveness to U.S. views on matters of mutual interest.
4. More rapid and rational economic and social development of Morocco.
5. Continued access to Morocco by U.S. goods, services and capital on a non-discriminatory basis.
6. Increased Western European economic and military assistance and increased international organization economic assistance to Morocco.
7. A preservation of Moroccan independence at least to the extent that it not be used by a hostile power capable of effective military action against NATO interests.

C. Morocco's Objectives Vis-a-Vis the United States

1. Use U.S. as counterweight to French presence in political and economic/military assistance fields.
2. Maximize U.S. contribution to economic development plans.
3. Maximize U.S. military assistance.
4. Maintain U.S. interest in Morocco, through Kenitra, to the extent this does not become an unacceptable political (internal and/or external) liability to the Moroccan Government.
5. Obtain U.S. support to influence the Spanish towards a settlement on the Saharan issue.

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D. Recommended Courses of Action

1. Recognize that over next five years maximum possible US support for the Moroccan development effort best assures GOM ability and willingness to cope with economic and social problems that are likely to grow more critical in the late seventies.
2. Attempt to keep our use of the Kenitra communications facility out of a quid-pro-quo context and as a part of our overall relationship while at the same time insuring that the Moroccans realize the value of this total relationship.
3. Continue the present 10 million dollar annual level of military sales credits, stretched to the extent possible by sales from excess military materiel stocks at nominal prices, at least as long as we remain at Kenitra.
4. Increase grant military assistance for training to the former annual level of 1.2 million dollars, at least as long as we remain at Kenitra.
5. If we decide we desire to remain at Kenitra, assure allocation yearly of sufficient US-owned excess foreign currency and dollar funds to maintain and operate the base and to provide continued training to Moroccan military personnel.
6. While leaving King Hassan and senior Moroccan officials in no doubt about U.S. confidence in the capacity of the regime to deal with current and future problems, put greater stress within U.S. aid programs on help to the Moroccans to solve increasing urban social and economic problems.
7. Continue PL-480 assistance to Morocco in a volume related to the needs of the economy.
8. Provide development loans, as appropriate, in cooperation with the IBRD and the Consultative Group of western aid donors to Morocco, over the next two years to help finance the balance of the Moroccan Five Year Economic Development Plan.
9. Continue US technical assistance for selective high priority development needs where the United States has a capacity for offering superior services. In this connection, place special emphasis on provision of French-speaking technicians.

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10. Encourage Export-Import Bank and private investors to participate in the Moroccan development effort.

11. Insure long term GOM commitment to support the Tangier university project, so that AID excess currency funds may be released for endowment purposes.

12. Contingent upon improved administrative procedures, encourage extension of Promotion Nationale to projects for slum clearance, low-cost housing, preparatory work on tourist complexes, and construction of a chain of national camp sites.

13. Contingent upon improved administrative procedures, examine with Promotion Nationale possibilities for projects of vocational training programs geared to public and private sector employment needs.

14. Encourage and cooperate where practicable with the Peace Corps, with foreign bilateral donors, and with international agencies in regional vocational training and civic programs designed to provide basic skills for the agricultural sector.

15. Increase exchanges of persons in educational and technical fields, with particular emphasis on identifying and cultivating promising young people.

16. Maintain and expand discreet contacts with opposition, student, labor, and youth groups.

17. Maintain an active information program that deals directly with press, radio and TV.

18. Maintain cultural presentations, exhibits, English teaching, libraries and book presentations.

19. Use the VOA regional center in Rabat to disseminate material designed to encourage Maghreb cooperation.

20. Provide quality material for use by Moroccan international broadcasts which are carried by VOA facilities for a total of 231 hours weekly.

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